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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
MITCHELL WORWOOD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20040701-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol with two 
prior convictions, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44 (West 2004), in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Juab County, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW1 
1. Was defendant's detention for field sobriety testing supported by reasonable 
suspicion, where his eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slow and slurred, and his breath 
smelled of alcohol? 
1
 The order of the issues has been reversed for purposes of the State's presentation. 
2. Did defendant's detention escalate to a de facto arrest when an off-duty trooper, 
suspecting that defendant had been driving drunk, transported him a mile and a half from a 
canyon location to a site more suitable for field sobriety tests and, if necessary, arrest? 
Factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law based 
on those findings are reviewed for correctness. State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \ 8. 
Application of law to underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases receives "non-
deferential review." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 15, 103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST., amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information dated 29 September 2003 with driving under the 
influence of alcohol with two prior convictions, a third degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-44 (West 2004). R. 1-2. After being bound over at a preliminary hearing, 
defendant pled not guilty. R. 19-20. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on the 
ground that defendant was unconstitutionally stopped and detained. R. 24-35. Following an 
evidentiary hearing and briefing, defendant's motion was denied in a four-page memorandum 
2 
decision. R. 36, 60-64, 92 (addendum A). Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea and 
was sentenced to a fine and a term of zero to five years, all but 180 days of which was 
suspended. R. 75-79. Defendant timely appealed. R. 81. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Driving down Deep Canyon in Juab County, Cory Wright and his friend, Skyler Fautin, 
observed a large wet spot in the dirt road. R. 92: 5. Nearby a man stood by a truck parked 
diagonally in the middle of the road, blocking the way. R. 92: 5. Cory and Skyler had been 
horseback riding up the canyon and were pulling a horse trailer with Cory's truck. R. 92: 4. 
When Cory saw the wet spot and a crushed beer can on the road, his "job kicked in" and he 
thought, "maybe this guy has been drinking." R. 92: 6-7. Cory was an off-duty highway 
patrol trooper. R. 92: 4. 
When defendant saw the truck and trailer approaching, he got into the truck and pulled 
off to the side of the road to let it pass. R. 92: 5-6. Instead of passing, Cory pulled up beside 
defendant, rolled down his window, and asked if everything was okay. R. 92: 6-7. 
Defendant said "Yeah" and stated that he had just stopped to urinate. R. 92: 6-7. However, 
Cory did not believe that one person could make such a large spot. R. 92: 6. He suspected 
that the spot was made by pouring out the contents of a cooler. R. 92: 6. He also observed 
that defendant's speech was "slow and slurred." R. 92: 8. And even from the driver's side 
of his truck, he could see that defendant's eyes were bloodshot. Id. Cory thought, "this 
3 
guy[']s got some alcohol in him"; in fact, he concluded that defendant was "very 
intoxicated." R. 92: 8, 13. 
Cory got out of his truck and walked around to defendant's pickup, where he smelled 
the odor of alcohol. R. 92: 8-9; R. 91: 4; R. 60, 62. Cory told defendant, "You know, we'd 
better have a trooper look at you before you drive anymore." R. 92: 8. At that point Cory 
considered defendant "detained." R. 92:15. He asked defendant for his driver's license, saw 
his name, and had him get out of the pickup. R. 92: 9-10. Although Cory did not know 
defendant, defendant knew who Cory was, and that he was a peace officer. R. 92: 15. 
Because Cory was off duty and "it would have messed up my night," he wanted another 
officer to perform field sobriety tests. R. 92: 11. Also, at the canyon location he had no cell 
phone or other means of contacting law enforcement; he therefore decided to transport 
defendant down to his (Cory's) own house, a "safer location" to have the field sobriety tests 
performed. R. 91: 5, R. 92:10,11. Although officers commonly perform field sobriety tests 
at roadside, they do so with a patrol car; Cory was driving a truck and pulling a horse trailer. 
R.91: 15; R. 92: 6, 9. 
Cory picked up the beer can, found it three-quarters empty, poured out the remaining 
beer, and tossed it into the back of defendant's pickup. R. 92: 10-12. He had defendant get 
into Cory's truck and drove about a mile and a half to his own house, which is at the base of 
Deep Canyon in the town of Levan. R. 92: 10. As before, while en route Cory smelled 
alcohol on defendant. R. 92: 9. Defendant was cooperative. R. 92: 16. 
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Meanwhile, Skyler drove defendant's vehicle out of the canyon, called the Juab County 
Sheriffs Department, and drove to Cory's house. R. 92: 10. Trooper Kevin Wright, Cory's 
brother, responded to the call. R. 92: 10; R. 91: 4, 14. All four men met at Cory's house 
outside Levan. R. 92: 10, 91: 12. 
Trooper Kevin Wright could also smell the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. R. 
91:6. He also observed that defendant's speech was slurred, he swayed when he walked, and 
his eyes were bloodshot. R. 91: 6-7. Trooper Kevin Wright performed the standard field 
sobriety tests. R. 91: 7; R. 92: 10. The horizontal gaze nystagmus test indicated that 
defendant had some alcohol in his system. R. 91:8-10. Defendant failed the nine-step-walk-
and-turn test and the one-legged-stand test. R. 91: 10-11. A portable breath test showed 
positive. R. 91: 11. Trooper Kevin Wright arrested defendant, took him to the Sheriffs 
office, and administered a breath test. R. 91:11,12. The test result was ".248 liters." R. 91: 
13.2 
With defendant's consent, Cory drove defendant's truck to defendant's house, giving 
the keys to his mother. R. 92: 11; R. 91: 12. Cory did this rather than impounding and 
inventorying it "because he was pretty decent when speaking with me" and "out of courtesy 
for someone that lives in the same community as I do." R. 92: 13. 
Defendant had two prior DUI convictions. R. 91: 24. 
2
 Presumably by this Officer Kevin Wright meant a blood alcohol level of .248 percent 
"per 210 liters of breath." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(c) (West 2004). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Off-duty trooper Cory Wright's detention of defendant up Deep Canyon was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. Defendant's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, 
his breath smelled of alcohol, an empty beer can was on the road nearby, there was a large 
wet spot in the road, defendant had an empty ice cooler, and defendant stated that he had 
stopped to urinate. Only a naive peace officer would fail to recognize these signs of DUL 
2. Defendant's detention by Cory Wright did not escalate to a de facto arrest. Cory 
Wright acted reasonably in deciding to hand defendant off to an on-duty officer in the valley. 
After observing defendant at close range, he reasonably concluded that defendant was 
intoxicated and required sobriety testing, for which the canyon roadside was an unfavorable 
location; it was neither safe or conducive to accurate testing. In addition, Cory was ill-
prepared to effect an arrest should one have been necessary. He was off-duty, pulling a horse 
trailer, and accompanied by a "kid" with whom he had been horseback riding. He had 
neither patrol car, cell phone, nor, presumably, handcuffs or a sidearm. It was reasonable for 
him to transport defendant a mile and a half and hand him over to an on-duty officer. 
Even if defendant's detention was a de facto arrest and that arrest was illegal for lack 
of probable cause, defendant is nevertheless not entitled to reversal. He has not demonstrated 
a causal link between the purportedly illegal arrest and the results of the field sobriety and 
other tests. Those test results were the fruit, not of the detention, but of Cory Wright's pre-
detention observations that formed reasonable suspicion. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION WAS SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE 
SUSPICION WHERE HIS EYES WERE BLOODSHOT, HIS SPEECH 
WAS SLOW AND SLURRED, AND HIS BREATH SMELLED OF 
ALCOHOL 
Defendant claims that the "articulable facts are not sufficient to create a reasonable 
suspicion of further illegality," and thus that Cory Wright "had no justifiable reason either 
to stop or to detain [defendant] in this case." Br. Aplt. at 11. 
District court's ruling. The district court ruled that when Cory Wright approached 
defendant and asked what he was doing, defendant was free to leave and thus defendant was 
not detained. R. 62. However, the court ruled that the totality of the circumstances, 
including defendant's bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, the odor of alcohol on defendant's 
breath, the empty beer can, the wet spot, the empty cooler, and defendant's statement that he 
had stopped to urinate, "caused the trooper to believe that [defendant] was under the 
influence of alcohol to the extent that he was unable to safely operate his vehicle." R. 62. 
Wright therefore "had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was committing a crime and 
lawfully detained the defendant to investigate." R. 63. "The encounter escalated to a level 
two encounter when Trooper Wright told the defendant that he could not drive his vehicle 
until he had been checked out by another officer." Id. 
Controlling law. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures: 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. "The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is 
[and] always [has been] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
government invasion of a citizen's personal security." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, 
\49 (quotingPennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,108-09 (1977)) (alterations in original). 
Reasonableness depends "on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right 
to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." State v. Warren, 2003 
UT 36, Tf 25, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, All U.S. 873, 878 
(1975) (citation omitted)). "The Fourth Amendment is not . . . a guarantee against all 
searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States 
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). 
"It is settled law that' a police officer may detain and question an individual when the 
officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity."5 State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, *[{ 10 (quoting State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation omitted)). To justify such a 
detention, the officer's suspicion must be supported by "specific and articulable facts and 
rational inferences," Id. (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th 
Cir.1990)), and cannot be merely an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" 
8 
Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27(1968). However, "[a] determination that reasonable suspicion 
exists... need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." United States v. Arvizu, 534 
U.S. 266, 277 (2002). Indeed, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level 
required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of 
the evidence standard," Id. at 274. 
In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop and detention, a dual inquiry 
applies. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 681. The first question is "whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception," and the second is "whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 20). 
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must. . . last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) 
(quotingFlorida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,500 (1983)). "Investigative questioning that further 
detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity." Id. "If reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise, . . . 
officers must diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain defendant." Lopez, 873 
P.2d at 1132 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Statev. Grovier, 808P.2d 133,136 
(Utah App. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,686 (1985))) (alteration in 
original). 
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Indicia of intoxication give rise to reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., State v. Ottesen, 920 
P.2d 183, 185-86 (Utah App. 1996) (holding that, after smelling alcohol on the driver and 
observing signs of intoxication, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was 
driving under the influence of alcohol); cf. State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, ^ 3-14, 89 
P.3d 209 (trooper administered field sobriety tests where defendant's eyes were bloodshot, 
he smelled strongly of alcohol, and his speech was slurred); State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 
831, 832 (Utah App. 1995) (trooper administered field sobriety tests after observing that 
defendant's breath smelled of beer, his eyes were red and glassy, and his speech was slightly 
slurred). 
Analysis. Cory Wright had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant briefly for the 
purpose of administering field sobriety tests. As the trial court correctly found, reasonable 
suspicion rested on seven factors, which, taken in combination, "caused the trooper to believe 
that [defendant] was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was unable to safely 
operate his vehicle." R. 62. These factors were (1) defendant's bloodshot eyes, (2) 
defendant's slurred speech, (3) the smell of alcohol on defendant's breath, (4) the empty beer 
can, (5) the large wet spot in the road, (6) the empty cooler, and (7) defendant's statement 
that he had stopped to urinate. Id. In addition, defendant's truck had been parked diagonally 
across the road, and Trooper Wright had seen defendant move it. See R. 92: 5. 
Viewed in combination, these facts gave rise to a reasonable inference that defendant 
had been drinking beer from an ice chest while driving down the canyon and that, after 
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consuming most of the last beer, he stopped to dump the melted ice out of the cooler, crush 
and discard the beer can, and relieve himself. It would be a naive peace officer indeed who 
failed to comprehend that these facts painted a picture of an intoxicated driver. 
In sum, these facts support the district court's finding that "under the totality of the 
circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was committing a 
crime and lawfully detained the defendant to investigate." R. 63.3 
3
 Indeed, he may have had probable cause to arrest defendant. In American Fork City 
v. Singleton, 2004 UT App 172, this Court addressed the question of probable cause in a 
drunk driving case. The Court noted, first, that Singleton "was operating a vehicle 
immediately prior to his encounter with the arresting officer." Id. at ^ 4 (unnumbered). It 
then noted that Singleton "had glassy, bloodshot eyes and was slightly swaying as he talked." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, when the officer tried to perform field 
sobriety tests, Singleton "became belligerent and refused to cooperate." Id. On these facts, 
"there was probable cause to arrest him to DUI." Id. 
Although Singleton's indicia of intoxication do not precisely mirror defendant's here, 
other courts have held that bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and an odor of alcohol support a 
finding of probable cause. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eckert, 728 N.E.2d 312, 319 (Mass. 
2000) (slurred speech, red glassy eyes, and strong odor of alcohol on breath warrant probable 
cause to arrest); State v. Crasco, 11 P.3d 555 (Mont. 2003) (unpublished decision; text at 
2003 WL 22171847) (bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and odor of alcohol supported DUI 
arrest); State v. Kier, 678 N.W. 2d 672,678 (Minn. App. 2004) (strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage on driver's breath, blood-shot watery eyes, and slurred speech supported finding 
of probable cause). 
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II. 
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION DID NOT ESCALATE TO A DE FACTO 
ARREST WHEN AN OFF-DUTY TROOPER, SUSPECTING THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD BEEN DRIVING DRUNK, TRANSPORTED HIM A 
MILE AND A HALF FROM A CANYON LOCATION TO A SITE MORE 
SUITABLE FOR FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS AND, IF NECESSARY, 
ARREST 
Defendant claims that his seizure "was an arrest, and the encounter in this case escalated 
directly from a level one to a level three stop within a matter of seconds." Br. Aplt. at 8. 
Defendant does not dispute that, if the trooper had reasonable suspicion, he was entitled to 
perform field sobriety tests there on the side of the canyon road. See Br. Aplt. at 11-12. Nor 
does defendant dispute that the eventual field sobriety tests yielded probable cause to arrest 
him. See Br. Aplt. at 8 ("it is not disputed that there was no probable cause to arrest in this 
case until after field sobriety tests were belatedly performed"). He complains rather that he 
was transported before being tested and arrested, rather than after. 
District court's ruling. The district court ruled that "it was reasonable for the trooper 
to transport the defendant a short distance from the mountain ro[ad] where the stop occurred 
to the trooper's home." R. 63. It was, the court found, "more fair to the defendant to conduct 
the field sobriety test in a location that would allow the officer to obtain accurate test 
results." Id. In addition, under the circumstances "it was reasonable for Trooper [C]ory 
Wright to hand off the investigation of DUI to another trooper in that the DUI statutes allow 
the trooper to hand off a DUI investigation and the trooper's actions did not cause an 
12 
unreasonable delay in the investigation." Id.4 In sum, the court found, "the defendant was 
not unlawfully detained." Id, 
A, Detaining defendant long enough to transport him to a more suitable site 
for field sobriety tests did not escalate the detention to a de facto arrest. 
Defendant argues that delay in conducting field sobriety tests converted the 
investigative stop into a de facto arrest. Br. Aplt. at 9. Case law identifies three levels of 
police/citizen encounters: a voluntary encounter, a brief investigative detention {Terry stop), 
and an arrest. 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime . . . ; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense had been committed or is being committed. 
Markland, 2005 UT 26, f^ 10, n.l (citation omitted, ellipsis in original). A level two 
investigative detention may, at some point, become so overly intrusive that it can no longer 
be characterized as a minimal intrusion designed to confirm quickly or dispel the suspicions 
which justified the initial stop. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 683-686. When the detention exceeds 
the boundaries of a permissible investigative stop, it becomes a de facto arrest, requiring 
probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979). 
4
 The court was apparently referring to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(10) (West 2004), 
which provides that "[a] peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in the peace officer's presence, and if the peace officer has probable 
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person." 
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In assessing whether a detention is "too long in duration to be justified as an 
investigative stop/' it is "appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (citations 
omitted). "Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no 
longer be justified as an investigative stop." Id. at 685. 
However, courts "should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing." Id. "A creative 
judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some 
alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished." Id. 
at 686-87. "But' [t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been 
accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, itself, render the search unreasonable." Id. 
at 687 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,447 (1973)); but see Royer, 460 U.S. at 
500 ("the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time"). 
This Court recently stated that an investigative stop of over an hour did not "assume the 
character of an arrest." State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, f 16, 101 P.3d 846 (holding that 
the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes), cert granted, Case no. 20050001-
SC. The Court observed that "it is reasonable for a stop to require over an hour when an 
officer calls support personnel who must travel to the scene." 2004 UT App 396, U 17. In 
Levin, the officers were dealing with three suspects at the scene and had to perform multiple 
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tasks, including "summoning and awaiting support officers trained in drug recognition" and 
"performing field sobriety tests on each suspect for alcohol and drug consumption." Id This 
Court concluded, "Taken together, a stop lasting over an hour under these circumstances is 
not unreasonable." Id. 
Here, Cory Wright acted reasonably under the circumstances. He had seen defendant 
driving a truck. After observing defendant at close range, he had reasonably concluded that 
defendant was intoxicated. See Point I. He determined to detain defendant for field sobriety 
tests. However, a number of factors militated against performing the tests at the canyon 
location. The record suggests that the town would be "a safer location" for the tests than the 
side of a dirt road, especially where Cory was not in his patrol car. R. 91: 5, 10. Also, the 
canyon road was not conducive to accurate testing; indeed, the district court found that it was 
"more fair to the defendant to conduct the field sobriety test in a location that would allow 
the officer to obtain accurate test results." R. 63. 
In addition, Cory was ill-prepared to effect an arrest should one have been necessary. 
He was off-duty. R.92:4. He was not in his patrol car, but a truck. R. 92:4; R. 91: 15. He 
was pulling a horse trailer and was accompanied by "[a] kid" with whom he had been 
horseback riding. R. 92: 4, 10. He had no cell phone or other means of communication. R. 
92: 10. He presumably lacked handcuffs, a sidearm, or any other means of controlling a 
belligerent arrestee. 
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For an off-duty officer to detain a suspect and call for an on-duty officer to investigate, 
interrogate, and if necessary arrest the suspect is a common and appropriate course of action. 
It does not, without more, transform a Terry stop into a de facto arrest. 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, on closely analogous facts, held that a brief 
detention by an off-duty officer until an on-duty officer arrived did not transform a Terry stop 
into a de facto arrest. See Commonwealth v. Gommer, 665 A.2d 1269 (Penn. Super. 1995). 
There, an off-duty state police officer observed Gommer driving erratically and suspected 
that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 1273. She pulled Gommer over. 
Id. His eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he was uncooperative,. Id. at 1271. 
The off-duty officer identified herself as a member of the state police, instructed him to 
remain at the scene until other troopers arrived, informed him that she believed he was 
driving under the influence of alcohol, and took his keys. Id. at 1271, 1273. She "briefly 
detained him until the arrival of on duty state troopers who would be properly equipped to 
investigate and determine whether appellee was, in fact, intoxicated and, if necessary, to take 
him into custody." Id. at 1274. 
On these facts, the Pennsylvania court held that the off-duty officer's detention of 
Gommer "was not sufficiently coercive to rise to the level of a custodial detention or arrest." 
Id. Thus, Gommer "was not actually arrested until after [on-duty officers] arrived on the 
scene . . . " Id. 
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This Court has also rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge in a drunk driving case 
where the defendant was briefly detained until a backup officer arrived. In State v. Ottesen, 
920 P.2d 183 (Utah App. 1996), this Court held that Ottesen was reasonably detained where, 
within fifteen minutes of the initial stop, the officer checked the driver's and Ottesen's 
identification and the vehicle's registration, ran a warrants check on the driver, and called 
for a backup officer to perform a sobriety test. Id at 185. It took the backup officer five to 
ten minutes to arrive on the scene. Id. This Court held that after smelling alcohol on the 
driver and observing signs of intoxication, and notwithstanding the wait while a backup 
officer arrived, the detaining officer "properly and timely investigated his reasonable 
suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence of alcohol." Id. at 185-86. 
Here, having determined that defendant could not safely drive, Cory transported 
defendant to his own (Wright's) home, which was "right there at the base of Deep Canyon." 
R. 92: 10. The trip down the canyon was obviously brief, since the parties traveled only a 
mile and a half or less. R. 92: 10; cf. 91: 5. Driving a mile and a half, even on a dirt road, 
takes only a few minutes. Nothing suggests that Cory Wright made any unnecessary stops 
along the way or otherwise dallied in the course of transporting defendant out of the canyon. 
Cory Wright acknowledged that one reason he wanted to hand defendant off to an on-
duty trooper is that he was off duty and "it would have messed up my night." R. 92: 11. 
Defendant makes sport of this, observing with mock seriousness that "the possibility that 
properly conducting field sobriety tests on location might unfavorably alter the arresting 
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officer's evening plans is not recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement under 
either the state or federal constitutions." Br. Aplt. at 7-8. He then asserts lhat "it is not 
necessary or reasonable to take a defendant into custody without probable cause and transport 
him to another location to facilitate the officer's evening plans." Id. at 8. Obviously, 
arresting a suspect without probable cause is never reasonable or constitutional. But 
defendant offers no reason to believe that an off-duty officer's desire to remain off-duty 
transforms an investigatory stop into a de facto arrest. 
The more fundamental question defendant poses is whether transporting a suspect 
escalates an investigatory stop to a de facto arrest. The answer is that it does not: "it seems 
clear that some movement of the suspect in the general vicinity of the stop is permissible 
without converting what would otherwise be a temporary seizure into an arrest." 4 WAYNE 
R. LAF AVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2(g) (4th ed. 
2004). Accord United States v. Charley, 396 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the defendant was not under arrest when officer transported her to her home for questioning); 
United States v. Montano-Gudino, 309 F.3d 501,504 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that there was 
no arrest where officers escorted the defendant who was in the process of emptying his 
rented storage unit to a room in the storage facility offices for questioning); United States 
v. GorU 230 F.3d 44, 56 (2nd Cir.2000) ("it is well established that officers may ask (or 
force) a suspect to move as part of a lawful Terry stop"); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. 
Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir.2000) (where suspect found at door of room 320 of motel, 
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movement of him to nearby room 323 "for safety and security purposes" during Terry stop 
lawful); United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515-16 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that the 
defendant's stop was "not tantamount to an arrest" notwithstanding that "the officers drew 
their weapons, asked [the defendant] to accompany them [back to the crime scene] in one of 
their cars," and kept him in the officer's vehicle for over an hour); United States v. Nurse, 
916 F.2d 20, 24-25 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding that officers' conduct in preventing the 
defendant from getting into a taxi and escorting her back into the train terminal did not 
"exceed[ ] the established bounds for reasonable suspicion detentions"); United States v. 
Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 792 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that once defendant consented to 
search, moving the investigation or requiring him to ride in the patrol car to a nearby place 
where the search would be conducted did not convert lawful investigatory stop into an 
arrest); People v. Carlos M., 269 Cal.Rptr. 447,452, n.4,452-55 (Cal. App. 1990) (holding 
that half-hour drive to hospital for show-up showed "commendable dispatch"); People v. 
Stevens, 517 P.2d 1336, 406 (Colo. 1973) (holding that, where stop occurred in lobby area 
of prison, it was proper to take the suspect to a nearby conference room to facilitate the 
interrogation); State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086,1089 (Me. 1983) (holding that "it is within the 
reasonable scope of an investigatory stop or detention" and did not constitute an arrest for 
the officer to ask the suspect to get out of his car and get into the police cruiser to answer 
questions); State v. Quartana, 570 N.W.2d 618, 621-23 (Wis. App. 1997) (holding that 
taking suspect's driver's license and transporting him to the accident scene did not exceed 
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the scope of a Terry stop); Eckenrodv. State, 61 P.3d 635, 641 (Wyo. 2003) (holding that 
transporting defendant across the street to move away from a hostile crowd did not transform 
Terry stop into an arrest). 
However, transporting a suspect to the police station or to a secluded location for 
interrogation is a factor that may contribute to a finding that a Terry stop has morphed into 
an arrest. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811,815-16 (1985) (holding that transporting 
suspect from home to police station for interrogation was an arrest); Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491,499-508 (1983) (holding that police exceeded the limits of a Terry stop when they 
transported airline passenger to a "police room" within airline terminal, retained his ticket 
and driver's license, and retrieved his luggage from the airline without his consent); 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,208-16 (1979) (holding that transporting suspect from 
his neighbor's home to police station and placing him in an interrogation room exceeded the 
limits of a Terry stop). 
Here, defendant was subject not to an arrest, but to a "transport" or "transportation" 
detention. Eckenrod, 67 P.3d at 641; People v. Harris, 124 Cal.Rptr. 536, 540, 541 (Cal. 
1975) (en banc). Cory Wright transported him a short distance, requiring only minutes, to 
a location more suitable for the field sobriety tests to be performed by am officer "properly 
equipped to investigate and determine whether [defendant] was, in fact, intoxicated and, if 
necessary, to take him into custody. Gommer, 665 A.2d 1269, 1274. 
The district court properly ruled that this Terry stop did not escalate to an arrest. 
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B. Even if defendant was illegally arrested, he has failed to demonstrate 
that the evidence against him was "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Even if Cory Wright inadvertently effected a de facto arrest and that arrest was illegal 
due to lack of probable cause, defendant is nevertheless not entitled to reversal of his 
conviction without demonstrating that the police obtained the challenged evidence by 
exploiting his arrest. 
"[A]n illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction." Thomas v. 
State, 2002 UT 128, \ 7, 63 P.3d 672 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,119 (1975)). 
"The remedy for an unlawful arrest is the suppression of evidence obtained thereby." State 
v. Schreuder, 111 P.2d 264, 271 (Utah 1985). However, an illegal arrest does not 
automatically require the suppression of all evidence acquired after the arrest. Brown v. 
Illinois, All U.S. 590,599 (1975). The Supreme Court has "eschewed any per se or 'but for5 
rule; the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence sought to be used against a defendant was 
"obtained by exploitation of the illegality of his arrest," Dunaway, AA1 U.S. at 217 (quoting 
Brown, All U.S. at 600). In other words, the challenged evidence must be shown to be "fruit 
of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). 
Here, defendant has failed to demonstrate or even assert that the evidence he seeks to 
suppress was "the fruit of an illegal arrest." State v. Heaps, 111 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1985) 
(declining to reach an unpreserved Fourth Amendment issue). He asserts that his detention 
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"was unreasonable and unlawful, and all evidence obtained thereby must be suppressed." 
Br. Aplt. at 12.5 But no evidence was "obtained thereby." 
"Evidence seized during an unlawful arrest, or statements made by the person 
unlawfully arrested while in custody, are products of the arrest and will be suppressed." 
United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1509 (11th Cir. 1986) (denying suppression). 
"Evidence with only a loose causal connection to an illegal arrest, however, will not be 
suppressed." Id. (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). The law requires a "causal link" 
between the illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed. United States v. Ibarra-
Sanchez, 203 F.2d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
The case at bar is not the typical case where a defendant seeks to suppress evidence 
seized or statements made during the course of an allegedly illegal arrest. Defendant here 
challenges the results of alcohol testing conducted on the basis of pre-detention reasonable 
suspicion. Even before Cory Wright transported defendant, he "could see that he had been 
drinking," that "he was very intoxicated." R. 92:9,13. This observation, not the purportedly 
illegal detention, led to the field sobriety and breath tests and defendant's eventual arrest. 
Ibarra-Sanchez illustrates the need for a causal link between the purported illegality and 
the evidence sought to be suppressed. There, police legally stopped a van, removed and 
handcuffed the occupants and placed them in a patrol car. Ibarra-Sanchez, 203 F.2d at 357. 
5
 Although defendant never specifies what evidence he claims must be suppressed, 
see Br. Aplt. at 12, R. 26-35, he apparently refers to the field sobriety tests and breath test 
results. 
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They then approached the van, smelled marijuana, and searched the van. Id. The Fifth 
Circuit noted, "The officers' ability to smell the marihuana in the van and their decision and 
ability to search the van depended in no way on the manner in which they had previously 
detained the appellants after the stop." Id. The court reiterated that "there was no causal link 
between the post-stop alleged 'illegal' arrest of the appellants and the search of the van, 
which resulted in the seizure of [the challenged evidence]." Id. at 357-58. Accordingly, the 
evidence could not be suppressed. Id. at 358. 
Likewise here the challenged evidence was the fruit, not of the detention, but of 
observations made before even defendant contends he was detained. Thus, even if the 
detention was illegal, the results of the field sobriety and other tests are not suppressible. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted oiy?C/May 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MITCHELL L. WORWOOD 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 031600152 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being 
fully advised in the premises, issues the following: 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
1. On or about June 20, 2003, Korey Wright, an off duty highway patrolman, was in 
the area of Deep Canyon when he observed a pickup truck stopped in the middle of the road. 
Near the truck, Trooper Wright saw a man, a wet spot in the road, and a beer can. Trooper 
Wright observed the man get in the truck and pull it over to the side of the road so that Trooper 
Wright could pass. Trooper Wright later observed a cooler that appeared to have been recently 
emptied. 
2. Trooper Wright stopped to talk to the man, who was later identified as Mitchell 
Worwood. While talking to Mr. Worwood, Trooper Wright noticed Mr. Worwood had blood 
shot eyes and slurred speech. After talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer proximity, Trooper 
Wright also smelled the odor of alcohol. Based on these observations, Trooper Wright believed 
that Mr. Worwood was intoxicated and was unable to safely operate his vehicle. Due to this 
belief, Trooper Wright indicated to Mr. Worwood that he was not going to allow Mr. Worwood 
to drive until he had been checked out by an officer. Trooper Wright testified that Mr. Worwood 
was not free to leave at this point. 
3. Trooper Wright did not have a telephone or other means to communicate with law 
enforcement. Due to this fact, Trooper Wright asked Mr. Worwood to ride with him in the 
trooper's truck and have another individual drive Mr. Worwood's truck to Trooper Wright's 
house, which was nearby, in order to meet a law enforcement officer. Mr. Worwood then got 
into Trooper Wright's truck, Trooper Wright's passenger got into Mr. Worwood's truck, and 
they all drove a short distance to Trooper Wright's house. 
4. Another highway patrol trooper, Kevin Wright, responded to Korey Wright's 
house and took over this investigation. Trooper Kevin Wright administered field sobriety tests to 
the Defendant. The Defendant failed these tests, and Trooper Kevin Wright arrested Mr. 
Worwood. 
RULING 
The "right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures" is guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Generally, there are three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between police 
officers and the public: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop', (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 
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617-18 (Utah 1987)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that a person is not seized when a police officer 
merely approaches the person on the street and asks questions if the person stopped is willing to 
listen. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App 1987). In this case, Trooper Wright 
approached Mr. Worwood and asked what he was doing. At this point, Mr. Worwood was 
willing to listen and answer the trooper's questions. The defendant was free to leave, and 
Trooper Wright had not shown any authority over the defendant. Therefore, this Court finds that 
the trooper's initial interaction with the defendant was a level one interaction. 
A person is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when an officer 
deprives a person of his liberty by means of physical force or show of authority. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App 1987). Under the Fourth 
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be a reasonable 
basis for even a brief investigatory detention and officers must have a "reasonable suspicion, based 
on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47, 51 (1979). Whether the objective facts known to the officer support a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances and in light of the officers 
experience and training. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, while the trooper was speaking with the defendant, the trooper noticed that 
the defendant had blood shot eyes, that his speech was slurred, and that the defendant had an odor 
of alcohol on his breath. The trooper also observed the defendant's truck, an empty beer can, a 
wet spot, and an emptied cooler in the middle of the mountain road. Mr. Worwood also indicated 
to the trooper that he had stopped to urinate. These observations in totality caused the trooper to 
believe that Mr. Worwood was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was unable to 
safely operate his vehicle. 
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The Court finds that under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was committing a crime and lawfully detained the defendant to 
investigate. See, State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The encounter escalated 
to a level two encounter when Trooper Wright told the defendant that he could not drive his 
vehicle until he had been checked out by another officer. The trooper also testified that the 
defendant was not free to leave at this point. 
The defendant argues that his detention became illegal when the trooper required him to 
ride to another location and wait for another trooper to conduct field sobriety tests. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that an investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effect the purpose of the stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 
1987). 
In this case, the Court finds that it was reasonable for the trooper to transport the 
defendant a short distance from the mountain rode where the stop occurred to the trooper's 
home. The Court finds that transporting the defendant to another location was reasonable under 
the circumstances and that it was more fair to the defendant to conduct the field sobriety test in a 
location that would allow the officer to obtain accurate test results. Additionally, the Court finds 
under the circumstances that it was reasonable for Trooper Korey Wright to hand off the 
investigation of DUI to another trooper in that the DUI statutes allow the trooper to hand off a 
DUI investigation and the trooper's actions did not cause an unreasonable delay in the 
investigation. Therefore, the Court finds that the defendant was not unlawfully detained. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
denied. 
DATED this} [ J_ day of April, 2004. 
^fggDlto 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
*1 Defendant, Larry Singleton, appeals from a 
conviction for driving under the influence of 
alcohol (DUI). We affirm. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it 
denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained 
pursuant to his arrest because there was no probable 
cause to support his arrest. "This court reviews a 
trial court's legal determination of probable cause 
for correctness, affording some discretion to the 
trial court." Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 286, 
H 7, 76P.3dll70. 
"A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a 
person for [DUI] when the officer has probable 
cause to believe the violation has occurred, 
although not in his presence, and if the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44(10) (Supp. 1999). 
"[T]he determination of whether an officer can 
make a warrantless arrest should be made on an 
objective standard: whether from the facts known 
to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly 
... be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
person in [the officer's] position would be 
justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense." 
Bovo, 2003 UT App 286 at % 14 (second, third, 
and fourth alterations in original) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
Applying this standard to the instant case, it is clear 
that the arresting officer had probable cause to 
arrest Defendant for DUI. It is undisputed that 
Defendant was operating a vehicle immediately 
prior to his encounter with the arresting officer. It is 
also undisputed that when the arresting officer 
encountered Defendant, he had "glassy, bloodshot 
eyes" and "was slightly swaying" as he talked. 
Finally, it is undisputed that when the officer 
attempted to perform field sobriety tests in 
Defendant's house, Defendant became belligerent 
and refused to cooperate. Therefore, although 
Defendant was initially arrested for obstruction of 
justice rather than DUI, his arrest was nonetheless 
lawful because there was probable cause to arrest 
him for DUI. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and WILLIAM 
A. THORNE JR., Judges. 
2004 WL 1368211 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 172 
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